Refusal to Implement Russia Sanctions Passed by Congress with Veto-Proof Majorities (CAATSA)
Tier 3Documented2017-08-02 to 2019-01-01
Factual Summary
On August 2, 2017, President Trump reluctantly signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) into law. The legislation, which imposed mandatory sanctions on Russia, Iran, and North Korea, had passed the Senate by a vote of 98 to 2 and the House by a vote of 419 to 3, margins that would have easily overridden a presidential veto.
In an unusual signing statement, Trump called the legislation "seriously flawed" and stated that it encroached on presidential authority to conduct foreign policy. He asserted that while he was signing the bill, he would interpret its provisions in a manner consistent with his "constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations."
Despite the law's mandatory provisions, the Trump administration repeatedly delayed, weakened, or declined to implement key elements of the Russia sanctions.
On October 1, 2017, CAATSA required the administration to identify and sanction individuals and entities engaged in significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors. The administration missed this deadline and did not issue the required guidance for months.
On January 29, 2018, the State Department announced that it would not impose new sanctions under CAATSA's provisions requiring penalties against entities doing business with Russia's defense sector. The department stated that the threat of sanctions was already "serving as a deterrent" and that additional penalties were not necessary at that time. This determination contradicted the mandatory language of the statute, which did not grant the executive branch discretion to waive the requirements based on a subjective assessment of deterrence.
On January 30, 2018, the administration released a congressionally mandated list of senior Russian political figures and oligarchs close to the Kremlin. However, reporting by multiple outlets revealed that the list appeared to have been largely copied from a Forbes magazine ranking of the wealthiest Russians, raising questions about the seriousness of the exercise.
Senate Democrats called for a formal investigation into the administration's failure to implement CAATSA. Senator Robert Menendez stated: "Congress has imposed significant constraints on the president's ability to unilaterally lift sanctions on Russia for its aggression in Ukraine. The White House ignored the mandates in the law." Senator Chris Coons and colleagues issued a joint statement calling the administration's inaction "unacceptable."
In April 2018, the administration did impose sanctions on several Russian oligarchs and entities under CAATSA, including Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg. However, by December 2018, the Treasury Department moved to lift sanctions on companies linked to Deripaska, including Rusal, the aluminum giant. The Senate attempted to block the sanctions relief but failed on a 57-42 vote (short of the 60 needed to advance).
The pattern of resistance to Russia sanctions stood in contrast to the administration's eagerness to implement sanctions against Iran, which were expanded and enforced aggressively throughout Trump's term.
Primary Sources
1. Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Public Law 115-44, signed August 2, 2017
2. Trump signing statement on CAATSA, August 2, 2017
3. State Department statement on CAATSA implementation, January 29, 2018
4. Treasury Department OFAC designations under CAATSA, April 6, 2018
5. Senate roll call votes on CAATSA passage (98-2) and on the resolution to block Deripaska sanctions relief (57-42)
Corroborating Sources
1. ABC News: "Timeline of Trump's delays on Russia sanctions," 2018
2. Newsweek: "Trump Refuses to Impose New Sanctions on Russia," January 2018
3. The Hill: "Trump declines to implement new Russia sanctions," January 2018
4. The Hill: "Senate Dems call for probe into why Trump has not issued Russia sanctions," 2018
5. Senator Coons press release: "Trump Administration's inaction on Russia sanctions is unacceptable," 2018
Counterarguments and Context
The Trump administration argued that CAATSA was constitutionally problematic because it constrained the president's authority to conduct foreign policy and negotiate with foreign governments. The State Department maintained that the threat of sanctions alone was producing the desired deterrent effect and that premature imposition could complicate diplomatic efforts. Supporters of the administration's approach noted that sanctions were eventually imposed in April 2018 and that the president has constitutional authority over foreign affairs that limits Congress's ability to mandate specific executive actions. The lifting of sanctions on Deripaska-linked companies was defended on the grounds that Deripaska had sufficiently divested his controlling interest, a determination made by the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control.
Author's Note
CAATSA was enacted with near-unanimous bipartisan support specifically because Congress did not trust the president to act against Russia on his own initiative. The law was designed to remove presidential discretion on a matter of national security. Trump's resistance to implementing it, from the reluctant signing statement to the missed deadlines to the State Department's assertion that the law's mandatory provisions were optional, represents a documented pattern of a president working against the expressed will of Congress on a matter directly related to the foreign power that had interfered in the election that brought him to office. The contrast with the administration's aggressive implementation of Iran sanctions further underscores the selectivity of the approach. Whether this pattern reflects a legitimate policy disagreement about executive authority or something more troubling is a question the factual record makes difficult to avoid.